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Article 2

SECTION 1983 IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Martin A. Schwartz*
INTRODUCTION

There is no more important area of civil litigation in the
federal courts than actions brought under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. Section 1983 authorizes individuals who assert violations of their federally protected rights to seek redress against
those who acted under color of state law.2 A broad range of
important federal constitutional claims are asserted under this
statute, including many by arrestees, public employees, mental
patients, prisoners, landowners, consumers, recipients of public
benefits and students.3 Additionally, section 1983 claimants
* Professor of Law, Touro College-Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; BBA, City
College of New York, 1965; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1968; LL.M., New York
University School of Law, 1973. Professor Schwartz is the author of Schwartz and
Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses and Fees (2d ed. 1992), and the
monthly "Public Interest Law" column in the New York Law Journal and is CoChair of the Practicing Law Institute Program on Section 1983 Litigation.
The author expresses appreciation for the helpful assistance of his research
assistants, Stacey Levin and Lisa Levinson, students at Touro College--Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any
act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
Although federal habeas corpus proceedings might have an arguably equal
claim of importance to that of § 1983, habeas proceedings are civil in nature only
in the technical sense, Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of Illinois, 434
U.S. 257, 269, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1089 (1978), existing essentially to test the
constitutional validity of state court convictions and sentences. 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(1988).
2 See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
2 See generally Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 274 (1985); Harry A.
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assert a large variety of federal statutory claims.4
The complex world of section 1983 litigation derives from
diverse sources and entails an unusually broad array of potential defenses and other issues. For example, section 1983 itself
governs who can sue and be sued, provides what types of
wrongs may be redressed and requires that the defendant have
acted under color of state law. The Federal Constitution in
Article III sets forth the outer limits of the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, implicitly including
pendent claims and arguably pendent party jurisdiction; recognizes federally protected individual rights in the Bill of Rights
and Fourteenth Amendment; and, gives the states sovereign
immunity in the Eleventh Amendment.5 Federal court decisional law establishes various abstention doctrines6 and recognizes the ripeness, standing and mootness defenses. Other
issues include common law immunities, which provide potential defenses to personal capacity claims,' whether or not there
is a basis for imposing municipal liability, and proximate
cause! Finally, state law provides a pivotal role in issues of
res judicata,9 statute of limitations and survivorship."°

Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1985). See also
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KmRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES ch. 3 (2d ed. 1991).
" See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at ch. 4. The Supreme Court appears to have cut back on the scope of federal statutory claims that can be asserted under § 1983. Compare Suter v. Artist, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (denying enforcement of federal statutory reasonableness provision) with Wilder v. Virginia
Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (allowing enforcement of federal statutory reasonableness provision).
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (Eleventh Amendment applies in §
1983 actions).
6 See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at ch. 14. Some abstention doctrines
are embodied in federal statutes. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (Tax Injunction Act
and Johnson Act respectively) (1988).
7 See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at ch. 9.
See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (reading § 1983 as
imposing a proximate cause requirement).
' See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984);
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
"0 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (the mere fact of abatement of
a particluar lawsuit is not sufficient ground to declare state law "inconsistent"
with federal law and, thus, the District Court should have adopted Louisiana survivorship law). Additionally, applications for attorney's fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 invoke a complex area of specializa-
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Like the federal courts throughout the country, the Second
Circuit handles a large number of section 1983 cases presenting a wide range of claims and issues, many of which are complex and important." The major reported decisions rendered
by the Second Circuit in 1992 focused primarily upon two areas, municipal liability and qualified immunity. This is not
surprising as these are both highly significant issues frequently raising difficult, contentious questions.
Part I of this Article analyzes the court's municipal liability decisions. Part II then examines an important decision involving absolute immunity and its application to officials who
initiate civil suits. Part III explores the court's complex qualified immunity decisional law. Finally, Part IV discusses other
significant section 1983 decisions, specifically those involving
malicious prosecution claims, state action and punitive damages.
I.

MuNicIPAL LIABmLITY

The Second Circuit in 1992 rendered three important decisions concerning municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. section
1983. The court ruled that a municipality may not claim the
protection of absolute legislative immunity in Goldberg v.
Town of Rocky Hill;2 found sufficient evidence of a New York
City Police Department practice of disciplining probationary
officers that discriminated on the basis of gender in Sorlucco v.

tion in its own right.
" Approximately 47,000 § 1983 actions were filed in the federal courts in the
twelve-month period that ended September 30, 1992. See U.S. District
Courts-Civil Cases Commenced by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit During the Twelve Month Period Ended September 30, 1992 & U.S. District
Courts-Civil Cases Commenced by Nature of Suit During the Twelve Month Period
Ended September 30, 1992, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER
30, 1992, 24, 27 (1992) [hereinafter Tables C-2 and C-3 respectively]. Of these, the
Second Circuit heard 2023 civil rights appeals and 1493 prisoner civil rights appeals. See Table C-3 supra n.13. The 47,000 figure was derived by adding the
more than 11,000 "other civil rights cases with over 25,000 prisoner civil rights
actions." Similarly, the 2023 civil rights cases do not consist solely of § 1983 cases. Section 1983 and its case annotations occupy a separate volume of the annotated United States Code, running 1271 pages with a cumulative supplement for
1982-1992 case developments of an additional 563 pages.
12 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
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13 and determined that a
New York City Police Department;
complaint sufficiently alleged failures to train and supervise
police officers and assistant district attorneys regarding perjured testimony and Brady1 4 material in Walker v. City of
New York. 15 These three decisions provide important guidance
on several recurring section 1983 municipal liability issues.

Legislative Immunity: Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill

A.

In Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill,6 the Second Circuit
considered whether a municipality could claim the protection
of absolute legislative immunity. This was an issue of first
impression in the Second Circuit. 7 To place the case in its
proper legal context, it is necessary to consider the trio of Supreme Court decisions fleshing out the basic contours of section
1983 municipal liability, Monell v. New York City Department
of Social Services,I" Owen v. City of Independence,9 and City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts.2"
Modern section 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence
begins with the Court's holding in Monell that municipal entities are "persons" subject to section 1983 liability.2 At the
same time, however, the Monell Court determined that municipal liability may not be based upon the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Thus, neither monetary nor equitable relief may be
imposed against a municipality solely because it employed a
constitutional tortfeasor.2 3 It is only "when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that" section 1983 municipal

1 971 F.2d
14 Brady v.
15 974 F.2d
16 973 F.2d
17

l'

864 (2d Cir. 1992).
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
293 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1387 (1993).
70 (2d Cir. 1992).

Id.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).

19 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
20 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
21 The Monell Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) on this
point.
' Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
3

Id.
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liability may attach.2 4
The Monell Court left open the question of whether municipalities may assert some type of "official immunity,"2 5 such
as qualified or good faith immunity. It did hold, however, that
municipal entities could not claim absolute immunity because
it would obviously be meaningless to hold that although municipal bodies could be sued under section 1983, they are absolutely immune from liability.2" Such a decision would amount
to taking away with one hand what had just been given with
the other.
Taking up the issue left open in Monell, the Court resolved
that municipalities could not assert qualified immunity based
upon the good faith of their officers in Owen v. City of Independence." In resolving section 1983 immunity issues, the Supreme Court has focused upon the immunities existing under
the common law in 1871, when the original version of section
1983 was enacted, and the policies that underlie section
1983.' On both scores the City's claim in Owen of good faith
immunity failed: municipalities were generally not protected
by a good faith immunity defense under the common law in
1871, and denying qualified immunity to municipal defendants
furthers section 1983's compensatory and deterrent purposes.
Given that municipal officials who are sued for monetary relief
under section 1983 in their personal capacities are frequently
shielded from liability by absolute or qualified immunity,
"many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remediless if the city were.., allowed to assert a good-faith defense."29 Additionally, the threat of municipal liability provides municipal officials with an incentive to adopt policies
designed to minimize constitutional violations. All of these
considerations called for a rejection of the qualified immunity
defense. Owen thus resolved that municipal bodies may not
defeat claims for compensatory damages merely because their

Id. at 694.
' Id. at 701.

21

28 Id.
2

445 U.S. 622 (1980).

See Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335
(1986); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
29 Owen, 445 U.S. at 651.
28
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officers or employees acted in good faith.3"
Considering punitive damages in City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts," however, the Court ruled that municipal bodies
are absolutely immune. The Court found that municipalities
were immune from punitive damages under the common law in
1871 and that the legislative history of section 1983 revealed
no intent to abolish this immunity. Furthermore, immunizing
municipal bodies from punitive damages does not conflict with
either the policies of section 1983 or the punishment-deterrence purposes of punitive damages. On the contrary, immunizing municipal bodies from punitive damages sensibly
shields the innocent taxpayers, who ultimately must foot the
bill, and leaves punitive damages where they rightly belong,
with the offending official in his or her personal capacity."
It was against this background that the Second Circuit
considered in Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill3 whether a municipality sued under section 1983 based upon legislative action could assert absolute legislative immunity. The plaintiff,
Kenneth Goldberg, was a part-time supernumerary police
officer for the Town of Rocky Hill, Connecticut. He publicly
supported the Chief of Police concerning his handling of a
controversial incident in the town. The town council subsequently passed a resolution eliminating the position of supernumerary police officer from the budget. "4 Plaintiff brought
suit in federal court under section 1983, presumably for compensatory damages,3 5 alleging that the resolution was passed
" Id. At the time Owen was decided, the Supreme Court couched qualified
immunity in good faith terms, with good faith having objective and subjective
components. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975). This undoubtedly accounts for Owen's reference to good faith immunity. The Supreme Court subsequently reformulated qualified immunity into a wholly objective test. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
31 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
32 See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages may be imposed
against state and local officials who act with malice or callous indifference).
' 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992). The panel consisted of Chief Judge Meskill and
Judges Pratt and Nickerson (district court judge sitting by designation).
"' Actually, this was the second of two resolutions passed by the Town Council.
The first had limited the number of hours supernumerary police officers were
allowed to work each week. Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 71. After passage of the second
resolution eliminating the position altogether, the Town Manager offered a number
of former supernumeraries the position of "Special Constable," but no such offer
was made to plaintiff Goldberg. Id. at 71.
"' The specific relief sought is not spelled out in either the circuit or district
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in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment right to
speak out in support of the Chief of Police. He sued the town
and its mayor, town manager and eight councilmen, all in their
official capacities. Because a suit against an official in an official capacity is tantamount to suit against the entity,36 naming the various officials was superfluous. The Second Circuit
thus properly considered the suit as if it had been brought
solely against the town.
The town argued that it was entitled to absolute legislative immunity. The parties agreed that the town council resolution abolishing the position of supernumerary police officers
was a "legislative act."37 Two important consequences flow
from this conclusion. On the one hand, the resolution is a municipal policy providing a potential basis for the imposition of
municipal liability." On the other hand, if the council members had been sued for damages in their personal capacities,
they would have been protected by absolute legislative immunity. The Supreme Court has resolved that both state39 and
regional 0 legislators enjoy absolute legislative immunity, but
has never resolved whether local legislators are also so protected.4 1 Nor had the Second Circuit directly confronted the
issue. The court in Goldberg, however, expressed agreement
with the view of "at least nine other circuits" and Chief [District] Judge Brieant's "thorough and scholarly" opinion in
Dusanenko v. Maloney,4 3 extending absolute immunity to local
legislators." This conclusion makes sense, especially when
court opinions. Goldberg v. Whitman, 740 F. Supp. 118 (D. Conn. 1989), on reconsideration, 743 F. Supp. 943 (D. Conn. 1990), affd sub nom. Goldberg v. Town of
Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1992).
" Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 361 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985) (official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which the officer is an agent."); Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 635, 690 n.55 (1978).
Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 72.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (municipality may be liable for policy "made by
its lawmakers").
3' Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
4' Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979).
41 The issue was left open in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union
of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 738 (1980).
42 Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1992).
560 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 726 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1984).
" Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 72-73 and authorities cited therein; see also SCHWARTZ
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one considers the Supreme Court's command that application
of the common law immunities depends upon the nature of the
function carried out, not the title of the official.45 Viewed in
this light, it should be irrelevant whether an official who carried out a legislative function was employed by the state or a
municipality.
The pivotal issue in Goldberg was whether the council's
legislative act, in addition to providing a basis for establishing
municipal responsibility and providing council members with
absolute immunity from personal liability, had still another
consequence, namely, of providing the town itself with the
defense of absolute immunity.46 The Second Circuit held that
it did not.4" Judge Pratt, writing for the court, looked to the
rationale of Monell and Owen.48 Granting the municipality
absolute immunity would severely undercut section 1983's
purpose of providing a remedy when enforcement of a municipal policy or practice causes a deprivation of federally protected rights.4 9 Monell specifically held that municipal bodies
sued under section 1983 are not entitled to absolute immunity"--a ruling specifically acknowledged in Owen.5 Owen's
rejection of qualified immunity for municipalities rests in significant part upon the realization that because absolute and
qualified immunity frequently defeat personal capacity claims,
the remedy against the municipality may be the sole avenue
for redressing a violation of federally protected rights.
It is arguable that Monell and Owen did not definitively
resolve whether a municipal body is protected from liability
when the officials who engaged in the constitutionally offensive
conduct are shielded from liability by absolute immunity because they performed, for example, a judicial, prosecutorial or,
as in Goldberg, a legislative function.5 2 The great weight of

& KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 9.11.
"' See, e.g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478 (1978); Supreme Court of Virginia, 446 U.S. at 719.
46 Goldberg, 973 F.2d at 72.
47 Id. at 70.
48

Id. at 72-73.

49 Id.

at 74.
"' Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978).
" Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662, 665 (1980).
" Dicta in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985), however, states that
qualified and absolute immunity are "unavailable" in an official capacity action.
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authority in the lower federal courts, however, rejects municipal immunity in these circumstances,53 and rightly so. Owen's
rationale that a remedy against the municipality is especially
important because common law immunities frequently defeat
personal capacity claims holds even truer for claims confronted
by absolute immunity than for those governed by qualified
immunity. After all, qualified immunity will not defeat the
section 1983 claim when the official violated clearly established
federal law. 4 By contrast, officials shielded by absolute immunity may be protected not only in these circumstances, but
even when they act maliciously or in bad faith.55 There is,
therefore, an even greater need for a remedy against the municipality when officials benefit from absolute immunity than
when qualified immunity is at issue.
The town in Goldberg made one last-ditch effort to snag
the riches of legislative immunity. Relying upon a Connecticut
state law privilege that protects legislators against being questioned about their legislative motives, the town argued "that at
any trial it would be prevented from calling its own legislators
about the alleged retaliatory purpose and motive behind their
legislation." The Second Circuit was unmoved. To the extent
that the town sought to interpose a state law immunity defense to the section 1983 claim, this was clearly at odds with
the Supreme Court's teaching in Howlett v. Rose"7 that immunity from section 1983 liability is a matter of federal law.
Whether federal legislative immunity protects state and
local officials from having to testify as to their legislative motives presents a more difficult question. The Supreme Court
has told us only that in "some extraordinary circumstances"
legislative officials may be compelled to give such testimony,
but that this will "frequently be barred by privilege" and is
"usually to be avoided."" The court in Goldberg took the comSCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 7.2 (citing numerous cases).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S.
Ct. 534 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335 (1986).
" See Mireles v. Waco, 112 S. Ct. 286 (1991) (judicial immunity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity).
Goldberg v. Town of Rocky Hill, 973 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1992).
' 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 &
n.18 (1977) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
'
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mon sense approach that since the Supreme Court has made
legislative motive dispositive (or at least highly relevant) in so
many constitutional areas, such as racial discrimination,5 9
freedom of speech,6" and the Establishment Clause,61 legislative officials cannot be given an absolute privilege from testifyingabout their legislative motives.6
The municipal liability issue presented in Goldberg does
not seem to arise with great frequency because normally the
mere enactment of legislation does not cause a constitutional
violation; in most cases the alleged constitutional wrong comes
about from the enforcement of the legislative policy. Goldberg
presented the somewhat unusual situation where the enactment of the legislative policy itself was claimed to be unconstitutional.6 3 For this situation, however, Goldberg correctly resolved that absolute legislative immunity protects legislators,
not municipalities. ' 4
(1971)).
' See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
W
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
01 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
02 Contra Hollyday v. Rainey, 964 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir. 1992); Baker v. Mayor
and City Council, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 (1990);
Schlitz v. Virginia, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
' This situation is seen with some frequency in the land use area, where the
enactment of a zoning ordinance or other local legislation affecting the use of
property may be claimed to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brown v. Crawford
County, 960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992); Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d
172 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 939 (1992). So, too, the mere enactment of legislation itself may be claimed to violate freedom of speech. See, e.g.,
Brodarick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
" One possible complication that may arise from Goldberg, which was not
explored by the Second Circuit, stems from the Supreme Court's decision in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
732 (1980), holding that legislative immunity in § 1983 actions covers not only
damages but also declaratory and injunctive relief. Claims for prospective relief are
normally asserted against officials in their official capacity since the relief in substance is sought against the entity. Reading Consumers Union and Goldberg together may suggest that although legislative immunity does not shield a municipality from monetary relief (Goldberg), it does prohibit equitable relief (Consumers
Union). This would create a dichotomy of available relief in reverse to that drawn
by Eleventh Amendment decisional law which, in § 1983 cases, generally prohibits
monetary relief while allowing for prospective equitable relief. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); ScHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 8.7. But
such a combined reading of Consumers Union and Goldberg is not accurate. The
defendants in Consumers Union were state, not local, officials. The Supreme Court
in Consumers Union, therefore, had no occasion to consider the implications of
Monell and Owen upon the legislative immunity issue as applied to municipalities.
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B. Municipal Custom or Practice: Sorlucco v. New York City
Police Department
The Supreme Court in Monell recognized that municipal
responsibility for constitutional violations may result from the
promulgation of a formal policy, acts or edicts by final
decisionmakers, or a practice or custom that is so "persistent
and widespread" as to have "the force of law."" A persistent
practice may constitute a municipal policy whether carried out
by municipal policymakers66 or subordinates. When subordinates engage in a sufficiently widespread practice, the
policymakers are deemed to have received actual or constructive notice and to have acquiesced in the practice." In fact, a
practice or custom may represent municipal policy even when
it conflicts with an expressly articulated or formally promulgated policy. For example, in City of St. Louis v.Praprotnik"
all of the justices appeared to accept the proposition "that a
municipal charter's precatory admonition against discrimination" in employment would not insulate the municipality from
a discriminatory practice that is inconsistent with the stated
policy. "Refusals to carry out stated policies could obviously
help to show that a municipality's actual policies were different
from the ones that had been announced.""
There is, of course, no magical formula for determining
whether the conduct of municipal officials was sufficiently
persistent to constitute a custom or practice. Relevant factors
include the longevity of the course of conduct, the number and
percentage of officials involved and the gravity of the conduct."' Ultimately, each case must be evaluated on the basis
" Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 635, 691 (1978) (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)); see also City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988).
" A municipal policymaker is one who, under the state law, is given final
decisionmaking authority. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469 (1986).
G7 Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130 ("It would . . . be a different matter if a series
of decisions by a subordinate official manifested a 'custom or usage' of which the
supervisor must have been aware ....
[Tihe supervisor could realistically be
deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been formulated or initiated by a lower-ranking official."); SCIHvARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 7.8.
485 U.S. 112 (1988).
> Id.
at 145, n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring); see id. at 130-31 (O'Connor, J.).
o Id. at 131 (O'Connor, J.).
"
Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213
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of its own particular facts.
72
In Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department, the
Second Circuit considered the sufficiency of the evidence demonstrating that the New York City Police Department
("NYPD") had engaged in a pattern of disciplining probationary
officers that discriminated against female officers. The plaintiff, Karen Sorlucco, had been a probationary police officer in
the NYPD. In 1983, John Mielko, a tenured NYPD officer,
brutally sexually assaulted her for some six hours in her
Nassau County apartment.7 3 Mielko had located Ms.
Sorlucco's service revolver in her apartment, threatened her
with it and fired it into her bed.7 4
Upon learning of the alleged attack, the NYPD made what
might generously be described as a perfunctory investigation
that culminated in departmental charges being filed against
Ms. Sorlucco for failing to safeguard her service revolver and
failing to report that it had been fired." While this was occurring in New York City, Nassau County officials subjected her
to vulgar and abusive treatment and, in fact, filed criminal
charges against her for having falsely stated that she did not
know the man who raped her. Ultimately, the NYPD fired Ms.
Sorlucco for initially alleging and maintaining (for four days
before she actually identified Mielko) that her attacker was
simply named John, while Mielko, the accused rapist, subse76
quently retired from NYPD with his regular pension.
Ms. Sorlucco brought suit under section 1983 alleging that
her termination was the product of unlawful gender discrimination.7 7 Her theory of municipal liability was that the NYPD
engaged in a "pattern of disciplining probationary officers who
had been arrested while on probation... in a discriminatory... manner based upon... gender."7 Although the jury
(1979).
72

971 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1992). Chief Judge Oakes and Judges Lumbard and

Walker heard the case.
71 Id. at 866.
74Id.
71 Id. at 869-73.
76 Id. at 869.
71 She also brought suit under Title VII but that claim is beyond the scope of

this Article.
71 Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 871. It should be noted that lower federal courts routinely hold that police and other law enforcement departments are not suable
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rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,7 9 the district court
granted NYPD's motion for judgment N.O.V., setting aside the
verdict." The district court found that there was no evidence
linking the Police Commissioner to Ms. Sorlucco's discriminatory termination and "that no reasonable jury could infer an
unconstitutional pattern or practice of gender discrimination
from the evidence of disparate disciplinary treatment between
male and female probationary officers who had been arrested., 1
The Second Circuit, in a valuable opinion by Judge Walker, ruled that the district court erred in granting the NYPD
judgment N.O.V., reversed the judgment and remanded with
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict." As to the district
court finding that there was no evidence linking the Police
Commissioner to Ms. Sorlucco's discriminatory termination,
the court concluded that "[wihile discrimination by the Commissioner might be sufficient, it was not necessary."8 3 Although the court did not elaborate in much detail, what it
undoubtedly meant was that although a final decision of a
municipal policymaker provides a potential basis for imposing
municipal liability,' so does a widespread custom or practice,
even if carried out by subordinates. 5 Stated differently, mu-

entities under § 1983, thus requiring the plaintiff to sue the county, town or city.
See, e.g., Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210 (11th Cir. 1992); Fields v. District of
Columbia, Department of Corrections, 789 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992); East
Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 781 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Chan v. Chicago, 777 F. Supp. 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Stump v. Gates, 777 F.
Supp. 808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991). In Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d at 1214, after observing that "sheriffs departments and police departments are not usually considered
legal entities subject to suit," the circuit court found the issue governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), which provides that "capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of the state in which th¢ district court is held."
This issue, however, was not raised in Sorlucco.
" This jury verdict came after the Second Circuit had reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the § 1983 and Title
VII claims. Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 888 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1989).
" Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 870 (describing the district court decision).
! Id.

Id. at 875.
Id.
14 St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-31 (1988); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).
" Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 871 ("a § 1983 plaintiff may establish a municipality's liability by demonstrating that the actions of subordinate officers are sufficiently widespread to constitute the constructive acquiescence of senior
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nicipal liability may be based upon either a final decision of a
municipal policymaker or a sufficiently persistent custom or
practice. The one theory is not dependent on the other.
The district court's determination that no reasonable jury
could infer a practice or gender based employment discrimination was the focal point of the Second Circuit's decision. Contrary to the district court's evaluation, the court found that Ms.
Sorlucco introduced "sufficient evidence from which the jury
could reasonably infer an unconstitutional NYPD practice of
sex discrimination." 6
Plaintiffs evidence can be broken down into three categories: (1) the way in which the NYPD investigated the plaintiffs
complaint including, most significantly, the dramatically different ways it treated Mr. Mielko and Ms. Sorlucco; 7 (2) expert
testimony from an experienced former NYPD lieutenant with
Internal Affairs "that the department's investigation of Mielko
was dilatory and negligent";' and (3) a statistical study prepared by the NYPD regarding actions taken against probationary officers who had been arrested between 1980 and 1985.
During this period, 47 probationary officers were arrested, 12
of whom resigned. Of the remaining 35, 31 were male; 22 of
the male officers were terminated and 9 reinstated. All 4 of the
female officers who had been arrested were terminated. 9
Having received this evidence, the court disagreed with
the district court's conclusion that the study was "statistically
insignificant" because only 4 female officers were fired. The 4
women represented over 10% of the 35 probationary officers
who were disciplined. While 100% of the female officers were
terminated, only 63% of the male officers were fired.'

policymakers").
at 870.
" Id.
" "The actions of two internal offices of the NYPD . . . , working independently of each other, could have been reasonably taken to indicate that, as between
Sorlucco and Mielko, department officials reflexively assumed the former was lying
because she was a woman." Id. at 872-73.
" Id.

Id. at 871.
Id. at 872. The district court also believed that the nine men who were
reinstated were arrested for less serious charges than the four women who were
fired. The Second Circuit however, stated that "the district court should not have
substituted its judgment for that of the jury on this point. This type of analysis
went to the weight of the statistical evidence presented, not its relevancy . .. ."
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Although the statistical evidence by itself in all likelihood
would have been an insufficient basis upon which to find a discriminatory practice, there was sufficient evidence when the
statistics are considered together with the expert testimony
and evidence of the discriminatory treatment afforded Ms.
Sorlucco. 9 The way the investigation of her complaint was
handled made the cold statistics come alive, at least to the
extent that the jury could rationally reach the result it did.92
Sorlucco is an important decision, principally because of
its careful legal, factual and evidentiary analysis of the custom
and practice issue. Relatively few lower court decisions have
analyzed these issues with such care. A custom or practice will
almost always depend upon the introduction of circumstantial
evidence. The Second Circuit's decision sends a clear message
to the district courts that they should not lightly take these
issues from the jury. Finally, Sorlucco demonstrates how a
plaintiffs counsel can creatively piece together a case of circumstantial evidence to demonstrate a constitutionally offensive practice.
C. Inadequate Training:Walker v. City of New York
The ink was barely dry on Judge Walker's opinion in
Sorlucco when the Second Circuit issued another important
municipal liability decision, Walker v. City of New York. 3
Judge Walker also authored this opinion, which focused upon
plaintiffs claim of inadequate training.
Plaintiff Walker "spent nineteen years in prison for a
crime that it now appears he did not commit. In 1971 [New
York City] police officers and [Kings County] prosecutors covered up exculpatory evidence and committed peijury in order
to insure Walker's conviction despite their knowledge of
Walker's probable innocence."9 4 After finally securing his release in state court in 1990, plaintiff brought suit for damages
under section 1983, alleging that the conviction violated his
constitutionally protected rights and was attributable to New
9, See also Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir. 1988).
2 Sorlucco, 971 F.2d at 872.
974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1387, and cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993). The panel included Judges Newman, Pratt and Walker.
" Id. at 294.
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York City's deliberately indifferent training and supervision of
its police officers and assistant district attorneys. "Specifically,
Walker asserted that the City should have trained police officers and [Assistant District Attorneys ("ADAs")] not to commit
5
or suborn peijury and not to suppress exculpatory evidence.""
The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
reasoning that the obligations not to commit or suborn peijury
and to turn over exculpatory evidence were so obvious as to not
require specific training. 6 Finding that the complaint pled
proper failure to train and supervise claims, however, the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint, relying in
97
part on City of Canton v. Harris.
In City of Canton v. Harris, decided eleven years after
Monell, the Supreme Court resolved that a municipality's failure to train could provide the basis for imposing section 1983
municipal liability. The Court's unanimous decision, however,
imposed especially stringent requirements upon section 1983
plaintiffs. The plaintiff must show (1) deliberately indifferent
training policies and (2) that specific training deficiencies proximately caused the violation of the plaintiffs federally protected rights.9"
The Court in City of Canton provided two examples in
which training deficiencies might reflect a deliberate indifference that would result in violations of federally protected
rights. First, there are situations in which the need for training is so obvious that a failure to train is very likely to result
in violations of constitutionally protected rights as, for example, with respect to the constitutional limits on the use of deadly force mandated by Tennessee v. Garner.9 "It could also be
that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate
constitutional rights that the need for further training must

Id. at 295.
Id. In the alternative, the district court found that any failure to train regarding exculpatory evidence "did not proximately cause Walker's injuries, since
the police did turn over the exculpatory evidence to the prosecution and only the
prosecutor had a duty to turn the evidence over to the defense." Id.
489 U.S. 378 (1989).
's Id. at 387-92. The same requirements apply to failure to supervise claims.
SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 710.
9 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
'

'6
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have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are 'deliberately indifferent' to the need."'0 0 Although
many section 1983 claimants choose to hinge their municipal
liability claims upon alleged inadequate training, relatively few
ultimately succeed.' 1 This is not particularly surprising given the "high degree of fault" that the plaintiff is required to
demonstrate' 2 and the Supreme Court's explicit admonition
that federal courts not easily second-guess the wisdom of municipal training programs.' 3
The Second Circuit in Walker read City of Canton as imposing three requirements upon section 1983 claimants who
allege a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise:
First, the plaintiff must show that a policymaker knows 'to a moral
certainty' that her employees will confront a given situation .... [A]
policymaker does not exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to
train employees for rare or unforeseen events.
Second, the plaintiff must show that the situation either presents the employee with a difficult choice of the sort that training or
supervision will make less difficult or that there is a history of employees mishandling the situation ....
Finally, the plaintiff must show that the wrong choice by the
city employee will frequently cause the deprivation of a citizen's
constitutional rights.'

In order to determine whether the complaint satisfied these
standards, the court broke down the plaintiffs claims to those
against the New York City Police Department and those
against the Kings County District Attorney's office. Within
each of these categories the court separated the claims concerning exculpatory evidence from those regarding perjured
testimony.
Starting with the claims against the Police Department,
the Second Circuit found that the district court had not erred
in dismissing the claim regarding exculpatory evidence. Plaintiff alleged that the police had in fact turned over all exculpa-

"' Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
101SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 7.10 & 1993 Cumulative Supplement No. 2.
, 2 Harris, 489 U.S. at 396 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
' Id. at 392.
101 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 1387, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1412 (1993).
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tory material to the prosecutors, which satisfied the Police
Department's obligations under Brady v. Maryland."5 The
district court thus did not err in dismissing this part of the
complaint. It erred, however, in dismissing the claim concerning perjured testimony. Under normal circumstances a municipality would not be considered deliberately indifferent in failing to train and supervise police officers not to commit or suborn perjury because this is such an obvious obligation that the
failure to train or supervise would not likely result in depriva0 6 But this reasontions of constitutionally protected rights."
ing does not apply where there is a history of wrongdoing,
which negates the assumption that the subordinates have
"common sense" and basic ethical values." 7 In these circumstances, the city would be deliberately indifferent in failing to
train or supervise. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff should be permitted to pursue discovery to determine
whether there was a pattern of police officers committing,
suborning or condoning perjury "sufficient to require the police
and supervise police officers to assure they
department to10train
8
truth."
the
tell
Moving to the claims against the District Attorney's Office,
the court found that the plaintiff had stated proper trainingfailure claims with respect to both the use of perjured testimony and withholding of exculpatory evidence. As with the Police
Department, if there was a pattern of ADAs using perjured
testimony, the City's failure to train, even for something as
obvious as the obligation not to commit or suborn perjury,
would constitute deliberate indifference. With regard to exculpatory material, it could not be said that in 1971, only seven
years after Brady was decided, that the various "intricacies of
Brady" were so obvious that no training or supervision was
required.0 9 Plaintiff, therefore, had adequately alleged deliberately indifferent training by the Kings County District Attorney.
There was an additional complication in Walker: whether
the Kings County District Attorney was a municipal or a state

10

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Walker, 974 F.2d at 299-300.

107

Id. at 300.

108 Id.

109Id.
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policymaker. The answer to this question is critical because if
he was a municipal policymaker, Monell-Owen municipal liability principles would control; on the other hand, if he was a
state policymaker, the state's sovereign immunity guaranteed
by the Eleventh Amendment would apply."'
Prior to Walker, the Second Circuit had held that when
prosecuting criminal cases county district attorneys in New
York act for the State, thereby implicating the Eleventh
Amendment."' The court in Walker, however, determined
that county district attorneys act as county policymakers when
making administrative or managerial decisions, such as those
involving the training and supervision of staff.'
Walker's significance lies primarily in the circuit court's
careful and inciteful analysis of the training and supervision
issues. The decision is particularly important because it sends
a message that claims of inadequate training and supervision
should not lightly be dismissed at the pleading stage."'
The Second Circuit's three municipal liability decisions
rendered in 1992 cover a remarkable range of issues. They
encompass the most frequently invoked bases for imposing
municipal liability: formally promulgated polices (Goldberg),
policymakers' decisions and customs and practices (Sorlucco),
and inadequate training and supervision (Walker). The deci-

"' The Eleventh Amendment, which protects state government, against a federal
court award of retrospective monetary relief, does not protect local government.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 n.20 (1990); Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). This is
true even for violations of federally protected rights. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974).
. Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1014
(1989).
112 Walker, 974 F.2d at 301, relying upon Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d
142 (2d Cir. 1991) (District Attorney acts as county policymaker with respect to
discipline of subordinates).
One final complication in Walker stemmed from the fact that the plaintiff had
sued the City of New York, not Kings County. The City conceded, however, that
within their geographic domains the county district attorneys have final
decisionmaking authority over training and supervision matters. The Kings County
District Attorney thus acted as a City policymaker. Walker, 974 F.2d at 301.
' See also Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 941 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1991). Subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision in Walker, the Supreme Court
rejected a "heightened" pleading requirement for § 1983 municipal liability claims.
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113
S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
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sions reflect both an understanding of the policies behind
Monell and Owen as well as the difficulties facing section 1983
claimants seeking to establish municipal liability. They should
provide significant guidance to both section 1983 litigants and
to district courts within the Second Circuit.
II.

ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY: SPEAR V. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD

Although the Supreme Court has been "quite sparing in its
recognition of claims to absolute official immunity[," 4 it has
accorded absolute immunity from personal liability to officials
carrying out legislative," 5 judicial..6 and prosecutorial" 7
functions. In Spear v. Town of West Hartford,"' the Second
Circuit considered whether absolute immunity also shielded
town officials who had instituted a RICO suit. The controversy
had its genesis in an anti-abortion protest staged by Operation
Rescue at a women's health facility in West Hartford, Connecticut. A few days later, an editorial written by John Spear
criticizing the police department's efforts to disband the demonstrators appeared in a local newspaper.
The West Hartford Town Council passed a resolution authorizing the Town's Corporation Counsel, Marjorie Wilder, to
take legal action to prevent these protests. "West Hartford
brought suit in federal court to prohibit illegal protest activities. The suit, authorized by Wilder and acting Town Manager
and Police Chief Robert McCue, named Spear among other
defendants, and asserted RICO and nuisance claims .... .""

Spear turned around and brought suit in federal court under
section 1983 against, inter alia, Wilder and McCue in their
personal capacities, alleging that the RICO suit was brought to
retaliate against him for his editorial in violation of his First
Amendment freedom of speech rights. The district court disv. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
116 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
...Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); see also Burns v. Reed, 111 S. Ct.
1934 (1991).
118954 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 66 (1992). Chief Judge Oakes
and Judges Van Gaafeiland and Newman heard the case.
114 Forrester
"' Supreme

"1 Id. at 65.
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missed the complaint, holding, inter alia, that Wilder and
McCue were entitled to absolute immunity. The Second Circuit
agreed with that conclusion. 2 '
In an opinion by Chief Judge Oakes, the court relied
heavily upon the rationale of Butz v. Economou,"2' which extended absolute prosecutorial immunity to executive officials
who initiate administrative proceedings. The Court in Butz had
reasoned that the official's decision to initiate administrative
proceedings is akin to the prosecutor's decision to initiate a
criminal prosecution. In both cases absolute immunity seeks to
insure that the decision whether to initiate proceedings will
not be influenced by the potential of monetary liability.
The court in Spear found that this rationale applies to an
official's initiation of civil proceedings as well. 22 The court
thus concluded that "when a high executive officer of a municipality authorizes a civil lawsuit in pursuit of that
municipality's government interests, absolute immunity attaches."'23 The court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Burns v. Reed 24 did not call for a different result. In
that case, the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors who gave
legal advice to the police regarding the existence of probable
cause to arrest could not claim absolute immunity, primarily
because such advice was too far removed from the adjudicatory
function. Burns does not require rejection of "absolute immunity for decisions to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the
government."'2 5 Indeed, the decision in Spear appears to comThe Second Circuit also ruled: (1) that the complaint failed to state a proper
First Amendment claim because of plaintiffs "failure to allege any non-speculative
chilling effect[;]" (2) the complaint failed to state a substantive due process claim
because there was no allegation of conduct that "shocks the conscience[;1" (3) that
a § 1983 claim may not be based upon "malicious abuse of process[;]" and (4) that
there were no specific facts supporting plaintiffs claim of conspiracy between the
health center and town officials. Id. at 67-68.
12

...438 U.S. 478 (1978).

" The Spear court cited prior authority extending absolute immunity to government attorneys defending civil suits, Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565,
572 (2d Cir. 1986), and to government attorneys who initiate civil suits.
Augustyniak v. Koch, 588 F. Supp. 793, 797 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 794 F.2d 676 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 840 (1985). Spear, 954 F.2d at 66.
" Spear, 954 F.2d at 66. The court observed that if defendant McCue had not
authorized the suit but was only a complaining witness "he would not receive
absolute immunity." Id. (citing White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988)).
14 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991).
"' Spear, 954 F.2d at 68.
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port with both the functional approach to common law immunities as well as the rationale of prosecutorial immunity applied in Butz. 2 '
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Section 1983 claims are very frequently resolved on the
basis of qualified immunity. Indeed, the qualified immunity
defense may be asserted by any state or local official who is
sued personally and charged with violating the plaintiff's federally protected rights in the course of carrying out an executive
or administrative function.127 This accounts for a very high
proportion of all section 1983 claims. The qualified immunity
defense understandably is very attractive to section 1983 defendants. It potentially enables them to obtain a pre-trial or
even pre-discovery ruling disposing of the action as a matter of
law without a judicial resolution of the merits of the plaintiffs
constitutional claim. Moreover, a defendant whose pre-trial
motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds
is denied may seek immediate review in the court of appeals if
the immunity defense can be resolved as a matter of law.128
It is not surprising, therefore, that attorneys and jurists involved in section 1983 litigation devote considerable attention
to this defense.
The qualified immunity defense focuses upon whether the
defendant-official violated clearly established federal law. 29
This seemingly straightforward inquiry and the right of immediate appeal on this supposedly "legal" question have generated a steady stream of difficult issues and ongoing problems in

126 See also Shoultes v. Laidlaw, 886 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutorial

immunity protected city attorney's decision to bring contempt proceeding and
commencement of action to enforce zoning ordinance authorizing criminal penalties). But see Canell v. Oregon Dep't of Justice, 811 F. Supp. 546, 551-52 (D. Or.
1993) (state attorneys who instituted suit to collect debt not entitled to absolute
immunity; absolute immunity appropriate only when attorneys commence proceedings inherently governmental in nature, not when acting as a common creditor to
collect a debt).
12 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982); accord Hunter v.
Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
128 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985).
" See cases cited supra note 126.
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administration. The Second Circuit, like other circuit courts,
has been inundated with a large volume of qualified immunity
appeals, many of which present difficult issues. Application of
qualified immunity has proven to be as elusive in the Second
Circuit as elsewhere. Before tackling the Second Circuit's experiences with the qualified immunity defense in 1992,13 however, a review of the evolution of the qualified immunity defense in the United States Supreme Court is necessary.
The Supreme Court's Qualified Immunity Decisions

A.

1.

The Rulings

A logical starting point is the Supreme Court's 1975 ruling in Wood v. Strickland' that qualified immunity has both
objective and subjective components. Under this approach, an
official who either took action that a reasonable person should
have known was unconstitutional (the objective prong), or
maliciously intended to cause a deprivation of federally protected rights or other injury (the subjective prong) was not
protected by qualified immunity. But by the time the immunity
issue came before the Supreme Court in 1982 in Harlow v.
32 the Court was convinced that Wood's subjecFitzgerald,'
tive prong was incompatible with qualified immunity's primary
goal of weeding out insubstantial claims during the pre-trail
stage.'33 The section 1983 claimant could easily plead that
the defendant-official had acted with a malicious intent, a
factual issue, thereby enmeshing the official in potentially
"broad ranging discovery" and, very likely, a trial. 34 The

13 Because of the importance of the qualified immunity defense, the discussion
will include three important decisions rendered during the latter part of 1991 and
reported in 1992: Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992); Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1991); and Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1991).
131 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
'- 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Although Harlow was a Bivens action against a federal
official, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court applies the same immunities standards in Bivens
actions as it does in § 1983 actions. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30; accord Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986).
'.'
134

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.

Id. at 816-18; see Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1832 (1992).
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Harlow Court therefore eliminated the subjective malice prong
and defined qualified immunity solely by reference to a standard of objective reasonableness: did the official "violate
'clearly established' [federal] statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known."'3 5 This issue was intended to be a question of law for the district court
to decide as early in the litigation as possible.'3 6
There were two especially important post-Harlow developments in the Supreme Court. In Anderson v. Creighton,'3 7 the
Court ruled that application of Harlow immunity requires an
evaluation of the specific federal right in light of the particular
factual circumstances. It is not sufficient, for example, to talk
about a "clearly established" 3 ' right to due process of law.
Rather, the proper inquiry is whether the defendant's specific
conduct violated a clearly established principle of due process.3 9 There is often a tension, however, between Anderson's
fact-specific issue-specific focus and Harlow's purpose of resolving the immunity defense resolved as a matter of law prior to
any significant development of the facts.
The other major post-Harlow development was the Court's
holding in Mitchell v. Forsyth' that, as an exception to the
federal courts' final judgment rule, a district court's denial of
qualified immunity is immediately appealable if the immunity
defense can be determined as a matter of law. Because qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability[,] ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial."'' Thus, "a district court's de-

1. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
138 Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 536 (1991).
12 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
18 See, e.g., infra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.

...Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639. The Court in Anderson stated:
[Tihe right the official is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly
established" in a more particularized, and hence more relevant sense: The
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not
to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is
to say that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. at 640.
140 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
141 Id.
at 526.
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nial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on
an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1291, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.""' The impact of the Mitchell right
of immediate appeal cannot be overstated. Defendants are
pursuing these appeals in record numbers. The appeal effectively puts the case pending in the district court on hold while
the interlocutory appeal is processed.1 3 Additionally, the
right to an interlocutory appeal may mean that the plaintiff
will have to shoulder the burden and expense of multiple appeals.'
2.

Difficulties at Large

At first glance the Supreme Court's qualified immunity
case law appears to articulate a fairly workable set of principles. After all, the Court has established an objective legal
standard to which it has devoted a good deal of attention.
Thus, it might seem that the lower courts need only apply this
objective standard to the facts of the particular case before
them. But the simplicity is deceiving. The overriding problem
is the Supreme Court's insistence that the immunity defense
be decided as a matter of law, when the reality is that factual
issues must frequently be resolved in order to determine
whether the defendant violated clearly established federal
law. 45 It is one thing to apply an objective legal principle
14 Id. at 530. The order is appealable under the "collateral order" doctrine.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
Aposstol v. Gallion, 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989).
1
14. Additionally, there are several other important post-Harlow Supreme Court
rulings. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827 (1992) (private party state actor
who utilized a prejudgment remedy could not claim qualified immunity); Hunter v.
Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991) (reaffirming that qualified immunity is an issue of
law to be decided by the district court at the earliest possible time and should not
be "routinely" put to the jury); Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991) (holding
that before resolving the immunity defense court must first determine whether the
plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987) (applying Harlow to warrantless arrests and searches); Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (applying Harlow qualified immunity to warrant
applications); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (official's violation of clearly
established state law is irrelevant under Harlow, as the pertinent inquiry is
whether the defendant violated clearly established federal law).
1,'See Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's Manual, 26 IND. L. REV.
187, 207 (1993).
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once the facts are found. It is quite another matter to apply it
before the facts are found.
There are other significant recurring difficulties surrounding the Harlow defense as well. For example, the Supreme
Court has provided very little guidance on how to evaluate
whether the federal law was "clearly established." As a result,
the circuit courts are not in accord as to what body of law
should be considered and "[e]ven within the same circuit, there
is not always agreement on whether the contours of the right
have been clearly established." "'
Also, application of
Harlow'§ purely objective standard has been especially awkward in cases where intent or motive is an element of the
constitutional claim, " 7 as well as in cases where objective
reasonableness is itself the constitutional standard. "8 Additionally, it is often far from clear whether an interlocutory
appeal frbm a district court's denial of qualified immunity
turns on an issue of law, an issue of fact or mixed issue of law
and fact.' Finally, even assuming that there is a right of
immediate appeal, there is much disagreement over the issues
that can be raised on the appeal. 50 Thus, a lower court faced
with a qualified immunity defense cannot apply Harlow by
rote, as evidenced by the Second Circuit's 1992 decisions.
B.

The Second Circuit Experience

In six qualified immunity decisions, the Second Circuit
grappled with both issues of appealability and the underlying
merits of immunity claims.
1.

Appealability

All six of the Second Circuit's qualified immunity decisions
reported in 1992 came to the court on interlocutory appeal
from the district court's denial of the defendant's summary

"" Id. at 202; see also SCHWARTZ & KIRKIUN, supra note 3, § 9.20, at 534.
147 SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, § 9.18, at 530; see infra notes 236-52
and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (warrantless searches
and arrests); Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1991) (excessive force claim).
1.. See infra notes 155-235 and accompanying text.
...See SCHWARTZ & KIRMIN, supra note 3, § 9.26, at 581.
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judgment motion. Of these one was affirmed,"' three were
reversed'52 and two were dismissed because resolution of the
qualified immunity issue required a determination of factual
issues.153 One should not, however, read too much, if anything, into this statistical breakdown of reported decisions
because there is a strong likelihood that there were a large
54
number of affirmances in non-published summary orders.

In each decision, the court held true to Anderson v.
Creighton's'55 mandate that the court evaluate the federal
law in .light of the specific facts of the case. The court paid
close attention to the facts in cases in which the immunity
defense was appealable because it turned on an issue of law,
as well as in those cases in which the order denying immunity
was found to be non-appealable because the defense turned on
factual issues.
In Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield,'56 the plaintiff, a former
police officer, alleged that he was forced to resign in violation
of his right to procedural due process. The district court denied
the defendant-Police Commissioners' motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds because their entitlement to qualified immunity depended upon the resolution of material issues
of fact. The critical issue on appeal was the propriety of this
conclusion. The Second Circuit found that because factual
issues had to be resolved in order to determine the defendant
Commissioners' qualified immunity defense, the defendants
had no right to an immediate appeal. Specifically, because of
the section 1983 rule against respondeat superior liability,'57
the Commissioners, as supervisory officials, could be held lia.M Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3032 (1992).
..
2 Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1992); Mozzochi v.
Borden, 959 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1992); Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.
1992).
" DiMarco v. Rome Hosp. and Murphy Memorial Hosp., 952 F.2d 661 (2d Cir.
1992); Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1991).
114 See 2D CIR. R. § 0.23.
15 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
16 950 F.2d 880, 881 (2d Cir. 1991).
...Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The
rule established in Monell for § 1983 municipal liability applies in § 1983 actions
generally, including those in which supervisory liability is at issue. SCHWARTZ &
KIERLIN, supra note 3, §§ 6.4, 7.11; see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
166 (1985); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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ble only for their own wrongs; that is, for their personal involvement in the plaintiffs resignation. There were, however,
genuine issues of material fact concerning the Commissioners'
involvement in plaintiff's employment termination. The court
thus 8dismissed their appeal for lack of appellate jurisdic15
tion.
As in Moffitt, the appeal in DiMarco v. Rome Hospital and
Murphy Memorial Hospital159 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because of the presence of factual issues material to the
immunity defense. In that case, the plaintiff-physician claimed
that the defendant-hospital had denied him the privilege of
performing "esophageal dilation" in retaliation for his "whistle
blowing," thereby violating the First Amendment.1 6 In an
opinion by Judge Pratt, the court read Mitchell v. Forsyth6 '
as meaning that an immediate appeal lies only if the qualified
immunity defense can be determined as a matter of law. "If
resolution of the immunity defense depends upon disputed
factual issues, or upon mixed questions of fact and law, an
immediate appeal will not lie, and review of the qualified immunity determination will have to await the district court's
resolution of the factual questions.' 2
Claims by public employees like Dr. DiMarco that adverse
action was taken against them because of protected First
Amendment activity require an evaluation of (1) whether the
employee spoke out on a matter of public, and not merely private concern 6 and (2) if so, whether, under Pickering v.
Board of Education's balancing formula,"M the employee's interest in freedom of expression outweighs the government's
interest in effective and efficient government operations. Undoubtedly, these are "fact-sensitive" matters. 5 In spite of the
well established legal principles governing the plaintiffs First
Amendment claim, there were disputed factual issues that had
158 Moffitt,

950 F.2d at 886.

159952 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1992).
160 Id. at 662.
161472 U.S. 511 (1985).
162 DiMarco, 952 F.2d at 665 (citing Second Circuit decisions). Judges Mahoney
and McLaughlin joined in the opinion.
16 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 139 (1983).
.. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
" DiMarco, 952 F.2d at 665; see also Grady v. El Paso Community College,
979 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1992).
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to be resolved in order to decide the First Amendment claim.
"Since the qualified immunity issue is 'inextricably bound up
with the merits' of DiMarco's claim, those merits should be determined first by the district court."166 The court explained
the significance of the factual issues to the merits which, in
turn, were critical to resolution of the immunity issue:
The facts as developed at trial may show that DiMarco was so disruptive to the efficient and effective operation of the hospital that a
reasonable and prudent hospital and staff could not have anticipated
that their actions violated DiMarco's First Amendment rights. Alternatively, the facts may show disruption so minimal that a reasonable and prudent hospital and staff would have to anticipate that
disciplining DiMarco was in retaliation for protected speech. Since
"the immunity question cannot be decided without addressing
[DiMarco's] underlying claims on the merits,".., the claim of qualified immunity does not "turn[ ] on an issue of law,". . . and the
appeal must be dismissed.'

DiMarco, then, is an excellent illustration of the difficulties
that often exist in separating the immunity defense from the
merits. There was no serious dispute concerning the governing
legal principles; rather, the parties disagreed about what took
place. The defendants in essence raised the "I didn't do it defense[,]"' 6 8 a highly predictable position when a plaintiff alleges to have been victimized by an official's retaliatory conduct.
Moffitt and DiMarco demonstrate that when the Second
Circuit is convinced that there are disputed factual issues
which are material to the immunity defense, it will reject jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and dispose of it by dismissing the appeal. The dismissals in Moffitt and DiMarco,
however, occurred only after the Second Circuit had written
full opinions carefully analyzing the qualified immunity defense. Although the appeals were technically dismissed for lack
of appellate jurisdiction,1 69 the court in each case acknowl...DiMarco, 952 F.2d at 666 (quoting Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 356 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987)).
" Id. The court stressed, however, that its ruling should not be read as meaning that all public employees' free speech claims "will elude pretrial determination
of qualified immunity." Id. (citing Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 86 (2d Cir.

1988)).

1" See Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (Sloviter, J., concurring); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1986) (dicta).
C. A circuit court's dismissal of an appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction is
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edged agreement with the district court's conclusion that the
existence of material issues of fact called for denial of immunity. Therefore, the court's dismissals of the appeals operated
pragmatically as an affirmance of the district court's determination that the presence of factual issues required denial of
qualified immunity on summary judgment. '
It is not always clear, however, whether the immunity
defense depends upon disputed factual issues. In Cartier v.
Lussier,'' the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant-police
officers' affidavits did not establish probable cause to arrest
them. The officers moved for summary judgment on the ground
of qualified immunity, but the district court found that factual
disputes called for denial of the motion. The Second Circuit
disagreed, stressing that only material issues of fact justify
denial of qualified immunity. "Whether disputed facts are
material to resolving the applicability of [qualified immunity]
is a legal question subject to [the court of appeals'] de novo
review. ' The court ultimately concluded that the officer
was entitled to qualified immunity, reversed the district court's
denial of his summary judgment motion and directed the district court to dismiss the complaint." 3
In Cecere v. City of New York,174 the plaintiff challenged
the temporary removal of her child from their home by the
defendants, who were social services officials. Defendant
Puryear, a supervisory official, moved for summary judgment
on the ground of qualified immunity, but the district court
denied the motion, finding the presence of material issues of
fact. A majority of the Second Circuit' 5 disagreed with that
assessment. Given Puryear's supervisory role and the necessity
not regarded as a ruling on the merits of the appeal. PRO Harris, Inc. v. Boeing
Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); Elsenbein v.
Gulf & W. Indus., 590 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1978). Therefore, as a technical
matter, such a dismissal would not operate as the "law of the case," whereas an
affirmance of the denial of immunity would be the law of the case.
170 See Harris v. Coweta County, 5 F.3d 507, 509 (lith Cir. 1993) ("seems to be
no difference in the effect of the litigation" whether appeal from denial of qualified
imunity is affirmed or dismissed).
171 955 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1992).
112

Id. at 844.

...Id. at 847. For an analysis of the application of qualified immunity in
Cartier, see infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
174 967 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1992).
175 Judge Newman, joined by Judge Winter, wrote for the court.
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that he rely upon the evaluations of his subordinates, the court
found "that Puryear's belief that an emergency situation existed was objectively reasonable."'76 Judge Lumbard, however,
dissented, finding that disputed factual issues had to be resolved in order to decide the immunity defense. Because he
could not "find as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for Puryear to believe that an emergency existed,...
the appeal must be dismissed."'77 All told, of the four federal
court judges who considered the immunity defense in Cecere,
two thought there were no material issues of fact while two
others thought otherwise.
The issue of whether the defendant official has a right of
immediate appeal if she is denied qualified immunity on a
state law claim came before the Second Circuit in Napolitano
v. Flynn.' In that case the plaintiff alleged a section 1983
claim, which he conceded on appeal to be without merit, and a
Vermont State law claim that was supported by diversity jurisdiction.' In holding that the district court's denial of immunity is immediately appealable, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge McLaughlin, 8 ' found that although state law
determined the scope of immunity on the state law claim, federal law determined the appealability of the district court's
order. Under federal law, however, appealability turned "on
whether Vermont law, like federal law, holds that qualified
immunity is an immunity from suit rather than simply a defense to substantive liability.""'1 Because Vermont law considered its qualified immunity an immunity from suit, and not
just from liability, the court found the denial of qualified immunity immediately appealable.18 Finding that the officers
had not violated clearly established state law, the court held

17 Cecere, 967 F.2d at 829.
"7

Id. at 830 (Lumbard, J. dissenting).

176 949 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1991).

171 In the typical § 1983 case the state law claim falls within the federal court's
pendent jurisdiction or, as it is now called, supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1367 (1990).
18 Judges Walker and Cardamone joined the opinion.

,..Napolitano, 949 F.2d at 621.
18 Id. at 618; cf Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990) (denial of
state law immunity not immediately appealable because immunity was not immunity from suit), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2827 (1990), and cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2827 (1991).
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that the officers were protected by the state law immunity,
reversed the order of the district court and remanded the action to the district court with instructions to grant summary
judgment to the defendant-officers.
Finally, the Second Circuit's decision in Golino v. New
Haven183 provides an illustration of the wide range of potentially difficult issues concerning the appealability of an interlocutory order denying qualified immunity. Anthony Golino
had been arrested pursuant to a warrant and charged in Connecticut Superior Court with murder. The trial court, following
a preliminary evidentiary hearing, found probable cause to
support the murder charge. Ultimately, as a result of a blood
test substantiating Golino's claim of innocence, the murder
charge was dropped. Golino then brought a section 1983 suit in
federal court against the arresting officers and several others.
His constitutional claims focused upon the alleged lack of probable cause to arrest him. The officers moved for summary
judgment on qualified immunity and collateral estoppel
grounds. The district court denied the motion on the grounds
that factual issues precluded resolution of qualified immunity
on summary judgment, and found collateral estoppel inapplicable because Golino was not given an adequate opportunity to
litigate the probable cause issue in the preliminary hearing."M The defendant-officers appealed the denial of their
summary judgment motion, arguing that the district court had
erred in rejecting their immunity and preclusion defenses.
The Second Circuit first tackled the issue of appealability,
which presented some especially sticky issues. In an opinion by
Judge Kearse, the court noted that a district court's denial of
qualified immunity "is immediately appealable where the district court has rejected the defense as a matter of law [,]" but
not where it has determined that the "immunity defense requires resolution of genuinely disputed questions of material
fact.. . .""' This is not entirely accurate. Read literally, it
would mean that an immediate appeal would never lie whenever the district court denies a summary judgment motion on

1 950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991).
Golino v. City of New Haven, 761 F. Supp. 962 (D. Conn. 1991).
1
Golino, 950 F.2d at 868. Joining in the opinion were Judges Kaufman and
McLaughlin.
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immunity grounds because it finds disputed issues of material
fact. Rather, because the court of appeals has the authority to
determine its own jurisdiction, 8 ' it can determine whether
the district court correctly found that the qualified immunity
defense depended upon the resolution of disputed issues of
fact."' If the court finds that the district court was wrong
and that the immunity issue can be decided as a matter of law,
the district court's order is immediately appealable."' 8 Thus,
the more accurate principle of appealability is that the court of
appeals has jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of
immunity to the extent that the court of appeals can decide the
immunity defense as a matter of law.8 9
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Golino stated that
because the district court found factual issues pertaining to the
immunity defense, namely whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe they had probable cause, the
"ruling is not, in principle, immediately appealable." 9 ' It is
not clear what the court meant by "in principle." In any case,
this statement is erroneous since the court could determine
whether the district court's conclusion concerning the existence of material issues of fact was correct.' 9 ' The court, however, found an alternate route to appealability. There were no
questions of fact relating to the preclusion defense, which was
directly related to the immunity defense. This is because if the
state court's finding of probable cause was binding in the federal court action, it would mean both that there was no violation of constitutional rights and, of course, that defendants
could not have violated clearly established constitutional

...Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990); Bouchet v. National Urban League, 730 F.2d 799, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Roth v. McAllister Bros.,
316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963).
"' But see Blum, supra note 145, at 215 ("Some confusion and conflict exists
about the availability of interlocutory appeal when qualified immunity has been
denied because of material issues of fact in dispute.").
"S See Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1992); Mozzochi v.
Borden, 959 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1992); Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841 (2d Cir.
1992).
" Golino, 950 F.2d at 868 (Thus, we have jurisdiction to review appellants'
immunity defense only to the extent that it can be decided as a matter of law.").
" Id.
, Cartier, 955 F.2d at 842 ("We think rather the rule is when, as here, the
factual disputes are immaterial to resolving the qualified immunity issue, its protective mantle remains undissolved.").
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law.192 Thus, the denial of immunity was appealable to9 3the
extent that it turned on the purely legal preclusion issue.
To the extent that the immunity defense raised factual
issues, the court ruled that it could exercise pendent appellate
jurisdiction over these related questions. Because there was a
close relationship between the collateral estoppel immunity
issue and the "factual" aspect of the immunity defense, the
court exercised its discretion in favor of assuming pendent
jurisdiction "to review the district court's ruling that there
exist material questions of fact" concerning the probable cause
immunity defense. 94 The Supreme Court, however, has never
sanctioned the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction and
the circuit courts are in conflict on the issue. 9 ' The Second
Circuit itself has sent out inconsistent signals.' Nevertheless, having assumed jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal
in Golino, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's
rejection of the preclusion defense and its determination that
material factual issues pertaining to probable cause prevented
resolution of the immunity defense as a matter of law. It thus
upheld the district court's denial of qualified immunity.'97
2. Applying Qualified Immunity
Once a court of appeals has determined that the qualified
immunity defense can be decided as a matter of law, it must
address the merits of the defense. In 1992, the Second Circuit
applied qualified immunity in two especially difficult contexts,
applications for arrest warrants and allegations of retaliatory

Golino, 950 F.2d at 868 (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991)).
"9

Id.

Id. at 869.
See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, § 9.26, at 586 and 1993 Cumulative
Supplement No. 1.
" See, e.g., Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 927 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1991)
(doctrine should be "rarely" used); Francis v. Coughlin, 849 F.2d 778, 780-81 (2d
Cir. 1988) (rejecting the doctrine); San Filippo v. United States Trust Co., 737
F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying the doctrine), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985).
Of course where there is no right to an interlocutory appeal on any issue, there is
no occasion to consider the issue of pendent appellate jurisdiction. See DiMarco v.
Rome Hosp. and Murphy Memorial Hosp., 952 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1992);
Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886-87 (2d Cir. 1991).
1" This Article returns to Golino in the next section for its application of qualified immunity to plaintiffs claim of arrest without probable cause.
"'
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motive.
a. Arrests and Reasonableness:Golino v. New Haven
and Cartier v. Lussier
1 9 and its
As discussed previously, Harlow v. Fitzgerald
1
9
9
progeny defined qualified immunity by the purely objective
standard of whether the official violated clearly established
federal law. The Supreme Court has applied this objective
reasonableness standard even when the governing constitutional standard itself is one of objective reasonableness. Consider, for example, the Fourth Amendment in which a reasonableness standard forms the basis of inquiry into whether
there exists probable cause to support a search20 0 or an arrest.2"' The subjective good faith of the officer who performed
the search or arrest is irrelevant to the determination of probable cause.2' The Supreme Court has rendered important decisions applying qualified immunity in cases where officers act
without a warrant and in cases in which officers apply for
warrants.
In Anderson v. Creighton,"°3 the Supreme Court held that
qualified immunity applies to warrantless searches and, by
logical extension, warrantless arrests." 4 Anderson's application of qualified immunity to warrantless arrests and searches
means that an officer who acted without probable cause is
shielded from liability so long as she reasonably believed there

,98457 U.S. 800 (1982).
' See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
200 A search may be conducted only if there is probable cause, which is defined
as a reasonable ground to believe that items connected with criminal activity will
be found in the place searched. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 138 (2d ed. 1992).
...Arrests must also be supported by probable cause. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 57, at 116 (Matthew Bender 1991). Probable
cause to arrest exists if the facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest
would warrant a person of reasonable prudence to believe that an offense had
been committed. Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1991); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992); Calamia v. New York, 879 F.2d 1025,
1032 (2d Cir. 1989).
2" Beck, 379 U.S. at 97.

2' 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
20" See Hunter, 112 S. Ct. at 534 (applying Andersen to a warrantless arrest).
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was probable cause. Put differently, the officer is protected if
her decision about probable cause, though mistaken, was reasonable. 2 5 The Court thus asks whether the officer was reasonably unreasonable 6 and, accordingly, gives the officer
two bites at the apple to show reasonableness: one under the
Fourth Amendment
probable cause test and one under quali27°
fied immunity.
The Supreme Court in Malley v. Briggs2° ' analyzed the
application of qualified immunity to law enforcement officers
who apply for arrest warrants, and, logically, search warrants.0 9 Under the Harlow objective reasonableness test, the
pertinent inquiry is "whether a reasonably well-trained officer
in [the officer's] position would have known that his affidavit
[in support of the warrant] failed to establish probable
cause .... 210 It follows, therefore, that neither the officer's
belief that the facts in his affidavit were true, nor the
magistrate's issuance of the warrant on the basis of the affidavit, automatically shields the officer from liability. On the
other hand, allegations of malice will not defeat qualified immunity because, under Harlow, the officer's state of mind is
irrelevant. Thus, an officer "will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer
would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue,
immunity should be recognized."2 11 This is another double
reasonableness defense. Initially, the officer's affidavit in support of the warrant application must establish probable cause
(a reasonableness standard), but even if it did not, there exists
qualified immunity if an officer reasonably believed that there
was probable cause.

205
201
207

Id. at 537.
See SC-VARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, § 9.22, at 554.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 648, 659-67 (1987) (Stevens, J., dis-

senting).
20- 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
2" Id. at 344 n.6 (although Malley dealt with application for arrest warrant,
"the distinction between a search warrant and an arrest warrant would not make
a difference in the degree of immunity accorded the officer who applied for the
warrant").
210 Id. at 344.
211 Id. at 345.
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In two Second Circuit cases-Golino v. New Haven2 ' and
Cartier v. Lussier213-the court applied the qualified immunity defense to claims that police officers who applied for arrest
warrants deliberately omitted or misrepresented material
facts. Although Malley did not specifically address this question,214 the Malley Court may have had this situation in mind
when it concluded that qualified rather than absolute immunity will better serve the judicial process because qualified immunity may motivate officers to reflect upon whether their
affidavits
in support of warrants reasonably establish probable
215
cause.

The Second Circuit's decisions demonstrate the difficulties
involved in applying qualified immunity to claims that law enforcement officers deliberately omitted or misrepresented material facts in their supporting affidavits. In Golino, the plaintiff
alleged that the arresting officers' warrant application did not
establish probable cause. The district court denied defendant's
summary judgment motion on qualified immunity grounds
because of the presence of material factual issues. After considering the appealability issue, the Second Circuit analyzed the
immunity defense and agreed with the district court's assessment regarding the need to resolve factual issues. The court
first described qualified immunity as protecting police officers
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known,216 . ..or insofar as it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate those
rights[.]" 2" Although described as alternative inquiries, the
212950 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992).
213 955 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir. 1990).
2' See Olson v. Tyler, 825 F.2d 1116, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1987) (dicta).
215 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1986).
2" Golino, 950 F.2d at 870 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)).
217 Id. at 870 (emphasis added). On other occasions the Second Circuit has described the qualified immunity test as potentially involving three pertinent inquiries:
A defendant may establish a right to qualified immunity by showing that
it was not clear at the time of the official acts that the interest asserted
by the plaintiff was protected by a federal statute or the Constitution; or
that it was not clear at the time of the acts at issue that an exception
did not permit those acts; or that it was objectively reasonable for the
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inquiries are more accurately considered as two different formulations of the same principle. In Harlow, the Court referred
to "the objective reasonableness of an officer's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law" and to the
"'clearly established' statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known."218 Thus, under the
Harlow test, an officer who violated clearly established federal
law did not act in an objectively reasonable manner.
In any event, the Golino court then articulated the
Harlow-Malley standard with respect to arresting officers: "an
arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity... if either
(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that
probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence
could disagree on whether the probable cause test was
met."2 19 Again, while phrased as alternatives, the standard is
merely two ways of stating the same test.
The court then addressed the specific issue of the liability
of police officers who apply for arrest warrants. Generally, a
magistrate's issuance of a warrant justifies a presumption that
the applying officer was objectively reasonable in believing
there was probable cause."' This presumption can be overcome, however, by a showing that the officer intentionally or
recklessly made false statements or omissions of material
facts.2 ' Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized a Fourth
Amendment right to be free from warrant applications that
222
intentionally mistate material facts in Franks v. Delaware.
This holding logically extends to intentional omissions of material facts as well.2" Golino accordingly recognized that an officer who knows or has reason to know that she "has materially misled a magistrate on the basis for a finding of probable

officer to believe that his acts did not violate plaintiffs rights.
Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Robinson v. Via, 821
F.2d 913, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1987)).
218 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
219 Golino, 950 F.2d at 870.
220

Id.

2. Id. at 871 ("[Rlecklessness may be inferred where the omitted information

was critical to the probable cause determination[J") (relying upon Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)).
2'2

438 U.S. 154 (1978).

' Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281 n.5 (7th Cir. 1985); Supreme Video v.
Schauz, 808 F. Supp. 1380, 1394 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
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cause" is not protected by qualified immunity.2 24 The key
word here is "material."22 5 Following Franks v. Delaware, the
Second Circuit engages in a "correcting process" to determine
whether, after eliminating the material misstatements and
adding the material omissions, the corrected affidavit nevertheless contains facts sufficient to establish probable cause. 6
This type of harmless error analysis seeks to assess the likely
impact of the misstated and omitted facts on the question of
probable cause. 7
Applying this corrective process, the Golino court found
that: (1) the record showed that the defendant-officers deliberately withheld highly significant information; (2) disclosure of
the withheld information might well have led the state court to
find no probable cause; and (3) the weight that a neutral magistrate would likely have given this information is a question
of fact. Therefore, the court held that the immunity defense
could not be decided as a matter of law and that the district
court was correct in denying the defendant-officers' summary
judgment motion.2
Golino, 950 F.2d at 871 (emphasis added).
22 The Golino court stated that in the context of a summary judgment motion
the materiality issue presents "a mixed question of law and fact. The legal component depends on whether the information is relevant to a given question in light
of the controlling substantive law. The factual component requires an inference as
to whether the information would likely be given weight by a person considering
that question." Id. (citation omitted).
" See Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1992); Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918
F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1990). A recent federal district court decision contains a clear
explanation of the process:
Under Franks, suppression is not warranted unless the misrepresentations at issue were material, i.e., unless probable cause is destroyed by
removing the misrepresentations at issue from the warrant affidavit. In a
"material omissions" case, the question is necessarily reversed, i.e., suppression is not warranted unless probable cause is destroyed by adding
the omitted information to the warrant affidavit.
Supreme Video, 808 F. Supp. at 1395.
As the court put it in Cartier:
After performing this corrective process, if there remains an objective
basis supporting probable cause, no constitutional violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights has occurred, the factual disputes are
not material to the use of the qualified immunity defense, and summary
judgment should be granted to the defendant. Only if the corrected affidavit did not support an objective finding of probable cause would the
factual disputes be material to resolving the issue of probable cause.
955 F.2d at 845.
' Golino, 950 F.2d at 871-72.
'

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:285

Cartierwas decided two months after Golino. The Cartier
opinion, however, makes no reference to Golino, even though
both cases presented the same qualified immunity-corrective
process issues. The plaintiffs in Cartier, like the plaintiff in
Golino, argued that law enforcement officers who deliberately
misrepresent facts in their warrant applications cannot be
protected by qualified immunity.2 9 The Cartier court's failure to refer to Golino is especially unfortunate because the two
decisions do not follow precisely the same analytical route.
The Cartier court first noted that under Harlow the officer's mental state cannot defeat qualified immunity.230 But
this assertion missed the point of the plaintiffs' argument that
the deliberate misrepresentation may constitute a violation of
clearly established Fourth Amendment law. Thus, as numerous
decisions have recognized, the officer's mental state is releimmunity standard but to the constituvant not to the Harlow
23
tional violation itself. '

The Second Circuit's ultimate resolution, however, was on
the mark. Even though there may have been an intentional
misrepresentation, the court must perform the corrective process analysis to determine the materiality of the misrepresentation. "[A]fter the affidavit is corrected for intentional misstatements and omissions, if it still supports probable cause,
no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred."232 Unlike the
" Cartier, 955 F.2d at 846. In their brief to the court of appeals, plaintiffs
argued that "[w]hen the judicial finding of probable cause is based solely on information the officer knew to be false or would have known to be false had he not
recklessly disregarded the truth, not only does the arrest violate the Fourth
Amendment, but the officer will not be entitled to good faith immunity." Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 12, Cartier, 955 F.2d 841 (No. 91-7590).
The plaintiffs' argument in Cartier is supported by the Third Circuit's ruling
in Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993), that "[i]f a police officer
submits an affidavit containing statements he know to be false or would know are
false if he had not recklessly disregarded the truth, the officer obviously failed to
observe a right that was clearly established." Under Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335 (1986), such an officer is not protected by qualified immunity.
s' Judge Cardamone, joined by Judge Miner, wrote for the court.
2
See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 62 (1992); Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2796 (1991); Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1989);
Feliciano-Angulo v. Rivera-Cruz, 858 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1988); Musso v. Hourigan,
836 F.2d 736, 743 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Harlow does not require us . . . to ignore the
fact that intent is an element of the relevant cause of action.").
2 Cartier, 955 F.2d at 846.
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court in Golino, however, the Cartiercourt framed the immunity issue in legal terms: whether, after correcting the affidavits,
a reasonably competent officer could believe that the affidavits
established probable cause. Thus, "when reasonable officers
could disagree as to whether probable cause exists, the immunity defense is available." 3 The court concluded that because
reasonable officers could disagree as to whether the corrected
affidavits established probable cause, the defendant-officer was
protected by qualified immunity.
It might be possible to reconcile Golino and Cartieron the
basis of their different factual records. That is, from this perspective, one could simply argue that although the Golino
factual record did not allow for the determination of qualified
immunity on summary judgment, the Cartierrecord did. This,
however, does not appear to be a complete explanation of the
divergent results. Rather, Golino viewed the question of "[tihe
weight that the neutral magistrate would likely have given"
the concealed and misrepresented information as not a legal
question, but "a question to be resolved by the finder of
fact."2 34 To the Cartier court, by contrast, the immunity defense presented a predominantly legal inquiry, namely whether, after correcting the affidavit for misstatements and omissions, a reasonably competent police officer could believe that
it established probable cause.235 Given the recurring nature
of the issue, the Second Circuit-or even the Supreme
Court-at the earliest opportunity should clarify the appropriate approach.
b. Retaliation Claims: Mozochi v. Borden
Retaliation claims present another example of the lack of
predictability in determining whether the qualified immunity
defense will be viewed as presenting a question of law or fact.
For example, in DiMarco v. Rome Hospital and Murphy Memorial Hospital, 6 the Second Circuit stated that when public
employee, free-speech retaliation claims are alleged, it is nor2

Id.

"' Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 872 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3032 (1992); see also supra note 225.
"' Cartier, 955 F.2d at 845.
2 952 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1992); see supra notes 159-169 and accompanying text.
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mally necessary to resolve the factual merits in order to resolve the immunity defense because the immunity defense is
very likely to be " 'inextricably bound up with the merits."'23 7
The court's decision in Mozzochi v. Borden,23 however, demonstrates that in some retaliation cases the immunity defense
can be resolved as a matter of law. ,
In Mozzochi, Charles Mozzochi was displeased with
Glastonbury Town Manager Richard Borden's job performance.
Mozzochi wrote a series of unflattering letters to Borden and
other town officials that "often contained profane language and
9
expressed Mozzochi's intense personal *dislike of Borden.""
One of Mozzochi's letters to Borden contained a newspaper
article describing "the story of a disgruntled resident who had
murdered the mayor of an Iowa City and wounded two members of the city council."24 Knowing that Mozzochi had a firearm, Borden reported the mailing to the Chief of Police.
Mozzochi was subsequently arrested and charged with criminal
harassment. The charge was based upon both the newspaper
article and other letters. Not deterred, Mozzochi continued his
letter writing campaign.24 ' The criminal charge was eventually dropped.2 42
Mozzochi brought suit in federal court under section 1983
against Borden, the arresting officer and the Town. He alleged,
inter alia, that he was arrested and prosecuted in retaliation
for having engaged in protected free speech activity. The defendant-officials moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, but the district court found that factual issues
concerning the defendants' motive in having the plaintiff
arrested and prosecuted precluded resolution of the immunity
defense on summary judgment.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's
approach. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Siegert

' Id. at 666 (quoting Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 356 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 F.2d 896 (1987)).
2" 959 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1992).

Id. at 1176.
Id.
2141Id. at 1178.
29

240

242 The state trial court dismissed the criminal charges with respect to all of
Mozzochi's letters except the newspaper article. As to the charge growing out of
the newspaper article, the prosecutor "nolled" it (nolle prosequi) prior to trial. Id.
at 1176.
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v. Gilley,2 43 Judge Meskill wrote for the court that the first
step in resolving the qualified immunity defense is to determine whether the complaint alleges any violation of constitutional rights.2 44 The idea is that a complaint that does not
state a violation of any constitutional rights certainly does not
state a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.
This is, in fact, what Siegert clearly holds.245 The problem,
however, is that although some courts follow Siegert, others
ignore it altogether, including some Second Circuit panels.246
As a result, the court's methodology in deciding the immunity
defense has not been predictable. The Second Circuit is not
alone in failing to comply consistently with Siegert.24 7
The court then reasoned that while most of Mozzochi's
letters that were critical of Borden were protected by the First
Amendment, his mailing of the newspaper article was a threatening communication and, as such, was not protected
speech.24 Thus, the arrest and prosecution did not violate the
First Amendment because there was probable cause to support
the criminal charge. "[Blecause there was probable cause...
to believe that Mozzochi violated the harassment statute, we
will not examine the defendants' motives 249in reporting
Mozzochi's actions to the police for prosecution.
Thus, the court held that if there was probable cause to

243
244
4

111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991).
Judges Kearse and Pierce joined the opinion.

. Under the qualified immunity analysis commonly applied prior to Siegert,
courts could and would avoid deciding the issue of whether particular
conduct violated constitutional law as presently interpreted, if, at the
time of the challenged conduct, the right allegedly violated was not clearly established. This process frequently resulted in cases disposed of on
qualified immunity grounds, with no resolution of the underlying constitutional claim.
Blum, supra note 145, at 193 (footnotes omitted).
2. See, e.g., Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1992); DiMarco v. Rome
Hosp. and Murphy Memorial Hosp., 952 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1992).
247Blum, supra note 145, at 192 ("not all courts have digested Siegert's message").
2' "A criminal prosecution solely in response to a threatening communication
does not violate the First Amendment." Mozzochi v. Border, 959 F.2d 1174, 1178
(2d Cir. 1982).
24 Mozzochi, 959 F.2d at 1179-1180, relying upon Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d
364 (2d Cir. 1990). But cf. Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1988) (probable cause did not exist independent of an allegedly unconstitutional governmental
order).
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believe that the section 1983 plaintiff had committed a crime,
the fact that the arrest and prosecution were undertaken solely
in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity is irrelevant. This is hardly a self-evident proposition. Even among
those cases in which probable cause exists, police officers and
prosecutors have enormous discretion regarding whether to
take action against a particular individual. Viewed in this
light, the relevant inquiry should be whether the official took
the action for the purpose of retaliating against the individual
for engaging in protected free speech activity. Under the Supreme Court's framework for evaluating retaliatory motive
claims, the pertinent issue is not whether the prosecutor could
have initiated prosecution, but rather whether he would have
done so but for the retaliatory motive."'
The court also thought it relevant that the prosecution did
not succeed in silencing Mozzochi. It is not clear why the court
relied upon this factor given its holding that the existence of
probable cause rendered the alleged retaliatory motive irrelevant. Nevertheless, it held that "[a]n individual does not have
a right under the First Amendment to be free from a criminal
prosecution supported by probable cause that is in reality an
unsuccessful attempt to deter or silence criticism of the government."2 51 Reliance upon the lack of success of the officials'
efforts to deter speech is not persuasive. Certainly, even if not
deterred, it cannot be denied that Mr. Mozzochi may well have
been penalized for having engaged in protected First Amendment activity. The Second Circuit, however, found that because
the plaintiff had not alleged a violation of federally protected
rights, defendants were entitled to summary judgment based
upon qualified immunity."2 The decision in Mozzochi illustrates that the pressure imposed by the United States Supreme Court to decide the qualified immunity defense as a

" Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). A federal
district court, relying upon the "bad faith" exception to the doctrine of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1972), concluded that a federal court may enjoin a state
prosection undertaken in retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected
conduct because "the state has no legitimate interest in pursuing such a prosecution." Ruscavage v. Zuratt, 821 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
2 Mozzochi, 959 F.2d at 1180 (emphasis added).
22 The court also held that defendants were protected by qualified immunity on
plaintiffs claim concerning denial of access to the courts. Id. at 1181.
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matter of law may result in a less than full exploration of all
facets of the underlying merits.
Although the Second Circuit has been far from consistent
in applying the qualified immunity defense, the blame should
not be placed entirely at its door. The Supreme Court has
created an unworkable situation by insisting that the objectively reasonable Harlow defense normally be applied before the
facts have been found. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's
decisionmaking will be enhanced if it follows a consistent
methodology, especially with respect to the Siegert principle;
avoids the temptation to determine qualified immunity as a
matter of law when the reality is that it is necessary first to
resolve the facts; and pays close attention to existing Second
Circuit precedent and explains why cases that appear to raise
similar issues are decided differently.
IV.

A.

OTHER SECTION

1983 IssuEs

Malicious Prosecution: Hygh v. Jacobs and Roesch v.
Otarola

Since its 1980 decision in Singleton v. City of New
York,253 the Second Circuit consistently has adhered to the
position that the common-law elements of malicious prosecution..4 give rise to a section 1983 constitutional claim.5
Circuit courts throughout the country, however, have taken
widely different positions on this issue."' The Supreme Court
recently granted certiorariin a case from the Seventh Circuit

632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
.. The common law elements are: (1) the institution of a criminal proceeding;
(2) without probable cause; (3) with malice; and (4) termination in favor of the
accused. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 119 (5th ed.
1984).
. Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956
(2d Cir. 1988); Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1027 (1986); Conway v. Mount Kisco, 750 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1984), adhered
to, 758 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 84 (1986). The Second
Circuit, however, takes the position that abuse of civil process normally does not
give rise to a § 1983 claim for relief. Spear v. Town of West Hartford, 954 F.2d
63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 66 (1992); Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1943 (1992).
2-

"' For a survey of circuit court decisional law, see SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra

note 3, § 3.10 and 1993 Cumulative Supplement No. 1.
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which is expected to resolve the issue."
Two Second Circuit cases decided in 1992 analyzed whether a criminal proceeding has been "terminated in favor of the
accused," which is one of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim. In Hygh v. Jacobs," Judge Mahoney concluded
for the court259 that a dismissal in the interest of justice is
not a termination in.favor of the accused. Because a dismissal
in the interest of justice is neither an acquittal nor a determination on the merits, "it cannot provide the favorable termination required as the basis for a claim of malicious prosecution."260
261
The court returned to this issue in Roesch v. Otarola.
262
In a decision by Judge Newman, the court held that a termination pursuant to Connecticut's accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program was not a termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a section 1983 malicious prosecution or
false imprisonment claim. In reaching this conclusion the court
263
relied upon its holding in Singleton v. City of New York
that an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal under New
York law is not a favorable termination for purposes of section
1983 malicious prosecution or false imprisonment claims. Like
an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, dismissal under
the Connecticut statute leaves open the question of the accused's guilt. Although there were some differences in the
New York and Connecticut programs, each was designed for
the same basic purpose of giving the defendant a second
chance "by behaving well and abiding by the judge's instructions during a designated period to demonstrate that the
charges should not be pursued."2" The Second Circuit reasoned that

.. Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
1382 (1993).
'8 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992).
"' Judges Altimari and Winter joined in the decision.
20 961 F.2d at 368. The decision in Hygh also contains an important ruling on
damages, namely that damages for false arrest may encompass only the period
from initial custody until arraignment; subsequent damages resulting from continued incarceration may be attributed only to the tort of malicious prosecution.
261980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1992).
262Judges Feinberg and Cardamone joined the opinion.
26 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
26 Roesch, 980 F.2d at 852.
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[i]f we permit a criminal defendant to maintain a section 1983 action
after taking advantage of accelerated rehabilitation, the program,
intended to give first-time offenders a second chance, would become
less desirable for the State to retain and less desirable for the courts
to use because the savings in resources from dismissing the criminal
proceeding would be consumed in resolving the constitutional

claims."'

Finally, the court found that the same policy considerations
calling for rejection of the malicious prosecution claim also
pertained to section 1983 false arrest and imprisonment

claims.

6

Because termination in favor of the accused is not an element of a section 1983 false arrest or imprisonment claim,26

it is not obvious whether dismissal of the malicious prosecution
claim also required dismissal of these other claims. Moreover,
although the malicious prosecution decisions in Hygh and
Roesch regarding the favorable termination are sound, they fail

to address the more fundamental issue of whether there are
circumstances in which malicious prosecution constitutes a
constitutional violation. Whatever the United States Supreme
Court ultimately decides, it is unlikely to follow the Second
Circuit's view that the state law and constitutional elements
are simply identical.26
B.

State Action and the Unlawfully Appointed Officer: Malone
v. County of Suffolk

In the usual state action controversy the section 1983
plaintiff asserts that the defendant was engaged in state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and acted
2C Id. at 853.
2C The court relied

upon the reasoning in Konon v. Fornal, 612 F. Supp. 68, 71
(D. Conn. 1985) (having rejected the malicious prosecution claim because of the
absence of a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding, "it would be anomalous to allow the tort plaintifflarrestee to challenge here the existence of probable
cause for his arrest and incarceration for that same criminal charge.").
27 See SCHWARTZ & KIRKLIN, supra note 3, at § 3.11. But see Cameron v.
Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986) (state court conviction bars § 1983 false
arrest claims), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).
2C In prior cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the state law torts of
defamation, false imprisonment and medical malpractice do not, without more,
constitute constitutional violations. Paul v. Daves, 424 U.S. 97 (1976); see also
Baker v. McMollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 92 (1976).
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under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983, while
the defendant claims otherwise. The state action issue arose in
a unique manner in Malone v. County of Suffolk.26 9
In that case, the plaintiff claimed that two village police
officers had arrested him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He specifically argued that there were defects in
the appointments of the officers. ° and that these defects rendered the arrests unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Stated differently, plaintiff argued "that an arrest by unlawfully appointed police officers constitutes an unreasonable 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment."2"'
The Second Circuit found that the district court had correctly relied upon New York State law to determine the status
of the police officers as it may have affected the constitutionality of the arrest. 2 New York law distinguishes between de
facto officers who act under color of governmental authority
and whose law enforcement activities are legitimate, and mere
usurpers who act without any color of governmental authority,
and whose law enforcement activities are invalid.2" 3 The officers at issues in Malone fell into the former category. Interestingly, the court found that by bringing suit under section
1983, the plaintiff "all but concedes that [the officers] acted
under color of authority, since [section 1983] requires that [the
officers] acted under color of state law."2 '4 Color of authority
was also supported by the officers "full performance of their
duties, official recognition of and payment for their services
and the fact that the defects in their title had not yet been established at the time of the arrest[.]" 2 "5 Public policy supported this conclusion as well because a contrary determination
could place into question a wide array of police officer actions
and might even jeopardize the validity of convictions. 6 The
968 F.2d 1480 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
...The appointments were found to be defective under New York State law in
2-

state court proceedings. Nissequogue v. Suffolk County Dep't of Civil Serv., 157
A.D.2d 784, 550 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1990), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 915, 572 N.E.2d
34, 569 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1991).
21

Malone, 968 F.2d at 1482.

...Id. The members of the panel were Judges Pratt and Altimari and district
court Judge Friedman, sitting by designation.
273 Malone, 968 F.2d at 1482-83.
274

Id. at 1483.

.25 Id. (citations omitted).
to
(with regard
217 Id.

"police

officers

acting

under

imperfect

ti-
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court thus rejected plaintiffs assertion that defects in the officers' appointments rendered his arrest constitutionally infirm.
The decision in Malone is sound. Indeed, a contrary ruling
could allow police officers to defend section 1983 Fourth
Amendment claims on the ground that defects in their appointments rendered them non-state actors. Certainly, the critical
state action issue is not whether there was a state law appointment defect but whether the officer exercised power "possessed by state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law ... ,277
C. Punitive Damages: Vasbinder v. Scott
The Supreme Court resolved in Smith v. Wade. 8 that
punitive damages may be awarded under section 1983 against
a public official whose "conduct is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others." In
Vasbinder v. Scott,2" 9 the Second Circuit analyzed the scope
of appellate review of punitive damages awards in an opinion
by Judge Mahoney."'
The plaintiff was a "whistleblower" who was discharged
from employment, allegedly in violation of the First Amendment, for having reported suspected wrongdoing to the F.B.I.
When Vasbinder was first before the Second Circuit in 1991,
the court rendered an important decision, holding that the district court had erred in setting aside the jury's finding that an
award of punitive damages was warranted.8 ' In reaching
that conclusion the court articulated several important principles. First it found that the district court erroneously assumed
that the threshold levels for "compensatory and punitive purposes of punitive damages cannot be the same."2"2 Smith v.

tle . . . invalidation of their actions would undermine the finality of convictions
and would engender dilatory and costly lawsuits challenging the credentials of
arresting officers").
27
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961).
2'3 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
27, 976 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1992).
...Judges Winter and Pratt joined the opinion.
"' Vasbinder v. Ambach, 926 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1991).
"'2 Id. at 1342.
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Wade "expressly rejected the proposition" that the deterrence
and punishment purposes of punitive damages are served only
if the threshold for punitive damages is higher in every case
than the underlying standard for liability."28 3 This does not
mean, however, that the principles of compensatory and punitive damages are the same. On the contrary, while there is a
right to compensatory damages for the loss suffered, punitive
damages are a matter of discretion when the trier finds that
such damages are necessary to punish or deter.2
The court also found that the district court had erred in
ruling that "no reasonable juror could have concluded that [the
defendants] engaged in conduct that was outrageous or in
callous disregard of [the plaintiff's] rights."285 The court
found that, in view of the evidentiary record, a reasonable jury
could have found that the defendants had acted in callous
disregard of the plaintiffs rights and that the punitive damages were designed to encourage "other potential whistle-blowers and [to] deter [defendants] from disguising the retaliatory
nature of their action from outsiders. '2 6 The court also held
that the district court should not have dismissed the punitive
damages claim without allowing the jury to determine the
amount of punitive damages it would have awarded."7 The
desirability of proceeding in this fashion is that, should the
court reinstate the award of punitive damages, it would not be
necessary to remand the case for a trial on the amount of punitive damages. Because the district court had simply dismissed
the punitive damages claim, however, the Second Circuit had
to remand the action to the district court for trial on the
amount of punitive damages.
On remand, the jury awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in
punitive damages against each of the two defendants, but on
appeal the Second Circuit found the amount to be greatly excessive. 288 Appellate review of punitive damages ensures that
the amount awarded is not so high as to "'shock the judicial
conscience""" or, stated differently, the amount is reasonable
2" Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).
284
28

Id. at 52.
Vasbinder, 926 F.2d at 1342.

288 Id. at 1343.
287 Id. at 1344.
28

28

976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 121 (quoting Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d
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in light of the twin purposes of punishment and deterrence. In
assessing the reasonableness of the amount awarded, the reviewing court should ensure that the award should not: (1) be
so high as to work the "financial ruin" of the official; (2) "constitute a disproportionately large percentage of defendant's
net worth[;]" and (3) be so high as to cdnstitute a "windfall" to
the plaintiff, because punitive damages are not intended to
compensate or enrich the plaintiff."' Under this standard the
jury's punitive damage award was greatly excessive. The
award constituted more than fifty percent of one defendant's
net worth and, some thirty percent of the other defendant's net
worth, as well as over forty percent of his liquid assets.291
The awards were much greater than what was necessary to
punish and deter. The court opined that awards of $20,000 and
$30,000 would adequately accomplish these purposes. 2 But
because a circuit court cannot simply reduce an amount of
punitive damages, it afforded the plaintiff the option of accepting either a new trial on the amount of punitive damages or
the reduced amount. 3
The Vasbinder litigation illustrates the large number of
issues which can arise solely on the issue of section 1983 punitive damages. These two decisions indicate that the court is
struggling to implement fair, workable procedures and to
maintain punitive damages as a meaningful section 1983 remedy, without causing the financial ruin of the defendant.
CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit's section 1983 decisions cover an especially wide array of issues. The decisions reflect a conscientious
effort by the court to fulfill its judicial responsibility of adhering to the decisional law of the United States Supreme Court.
The decisionmaking process could be enhanced somewhat in
the qualified immunity area, but most of the difficulties there
stem from a fairly unworkable structure imposed by the Su-

876, 883 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988), in turn quoting Zarcone v.
Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1978)).
2)Id.

Id. at 122-23.
2.1 Id. at 122.
'

*29Id.
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preme Court. Overall, the Second Circuit's work in this highly
complex area is to be commended.

